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Abstract
The uneven cognitive phenotype in the adult outcome of Williams syndrome has led some researchers to make
strong claims about the modularity of the brain and the purported genetically determined, innate specification of
cognitive modules. Such arguments have particularly been marshaled with respect to language. We challenge this
direct generalization from adult phenotypic outcomes to genetic specification and consider instead how genetic
disorders provide clues to the constraints on plasticity that shape the outcome of development. We specifically
examine behavioral studies, brain imaging, and computational modeling of language in Williams syndrome but
contend that our theoretical arguments apply equally to other cognitive domains and other developmental disorders.
While acknowledging that selective deficits in normal adult patients might justify claims about cognitive modularity,
we question whether similar, seemingly selective deficits found in genetic disorders can be used to argue that such
cognitive modules are prespecified in infant brains. Cognitive modules are, in our view, the outcome of
development, not its starting point. We note that most work on genetic disorders ignores one vital factor, the actual
process of ontogenetic development, and argue that it is vital to view genetic disorders as proceeding under different
neurocomputational constraints, not as demonstrations of static modularity.
At times, genetic mutations give rise to atypi- determined, innate specification of such mod-
ules (Pinker, 1994, 1997, 1999; Smith, 1999;cal development from embryogenesis onward.
Some are inherited, but others are due to pure- Smith & Tsimpli, 1995). But can one general-
ize directly from adult phenotypic outcomesly random events. One such genetic disorder,
Williams syndrome (WS), is caused by the to genetic specification in this way? In this
paper we argue against the simplicity of suchchance misalignment during meiosis of identi-
cal flanking regions surrounding some 25 claims and consider instead the way in which
genetic disorders are informative about the con-genes on one copy of chromosome 7q11.23
(see Donnai & Karmiloff–Smith, 2000, for a straints on plasticity that shape the outcome of
processes of development. In doing so, wereview). Because of its uneven cognitive phe-
notype in the adult outcome, WS has given raise a number of crucial questions. First, can
one use the selective deficits found in the ma-rise to strong claims about the modularity of
the human mind and the purported genetically ture, previously normally developed, brain of
adult neuropsychological patients to make
claims about the cognitive modularity of the
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and prespecified in the infant brain? We will function exactly as it did before the brain in-
sult, thereby giving rise to scores in the nor-answer in the affirmative to the first question,
with a caveat about whether such pure deficits mal range. Of course, in attempting to estab-
lish that apparently intact functions are indeedtruly exist. However, our response will be
negative to the second question, arguing that working just as they did before, the researcher
is always at the mercy of the sensitivity of themost work on genetic disorders ignores one
vital factor: the process of ontogenetic devel- measurement scale used. Our own work on
adults with genetic disorders has demonstratedopment. In particular, we submit that it is vital
to view genetic disorders as proceeding devel- that even when behavioral scores fall within
the normal range on standardized tasks, thisopmentally under different neurocomputation-
al constraints, not as demonstrations of static does not necessarily entail normal underlying
cognitive processes (Grice, Spratling, Karmil-modularity. We will illustrate our arguments
with the case of language acquisition in WS, off–Smith, Halit, Csibra, de Haan, & John-
son, 2001; Karmiloff–Smith, 1997, 1998; seealthough we maintain that the general tenets
apply equally to other domains of cognition also the process/achievement distinction intro-
duced by Werner, 1937). Nonetheless, in theand other developmental disorders.
case of the previously normal adult patient
and to the extent that genuine cases of pureSelective Deficits in Adult dissociations of behavior indeed exist, thenNeuropsychological Patients
those data tend to point to relative modularity
of mind.It is now well established that adults who had
previously developed normally can, in the
case of focal damage due to stroke or trauma, Selective Deficits in Patientsdisplay selective behavioral deficits (Cap-
with Genetic Disorderspelletti, Butterworth, & Kopelman, 2001; Ci-
polotti, Butterworth, & Warrington, 1995; What about selective deficits in adults with
genetic disorders? Do they suggest that theColtheart, 2002; Patterson, 1981; Rapp &
Caramazza, 2002; see discussion in Shallice, mind starts off with independent modules that
can be selectively spared or impaired? First, it1988). The existence of such patients has led
to the postulation that the brain is composed must be recalled that individuals with genetic
disorders have not developed normally toof modules, each dedicated to a specific kind
of input processing. Patients with severe adulthood and then suddenly suffered a brain
insult; their brains have developed atypicallyagrammatism may present with other aspects
of cognition, including nongrammatical as- from the outset. Yet, based on arguments from
the adult neuropsychological model, numer-pects of language, that seem to function nor-
mally. Likewise, other patients may have seri- ous claims exist in the literature for selective
deficits in disorders of a genetic origin, againstous word-finding difficulties but their syntactic
expression is fluent. This suggests that, by a background of intact or preserved function,
which are often allied to claims that such se-adulthood, specialized functions have become
relatively localized to specific brain regions lective deficits are evidence that cognitive
modules are innate (Baron–Cohen, 1998; Les-(in this case, that processing of grammar and
word-specific knowledge relies on distinct un- lie, 1992; Pinker, 1999; Smith, 1999; Smith &
Tsimpli, 1995; Temple, 1997).derlying circuitry). However, it is important
to recall that such an inference from selective It should be noted that the terminology
used here is misleading. Although researchersdeficit to normal structure is predicated on the
assumption that impaired behavior can be frequently employ terms like “intact” and “pre-
served” with respect to cognitive functions intraced to damaged underlying circuitry and in-
tact behavior can be traced to residual nor- genetic disorders, this is not what they actu-
ally mean. The terms intact imply that a pre-mally functioning circuitry. This assumption
corresponds to the idea that following focal existing system has not been damaged. This
may well be appropriate for adults who havedamage, the rest of the system continues to
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suffered damage to a previously normal cog- tion between neurocomputational constraints,
the environment, and ontogeny cannot be ig-nitive system, but there is no equivalent pre-
existing state for the developmental disorder. nored.
When researchers deploy terms like intact,
preserved, or “normal” for a genetic disorder,
Constraints on Plasticitythey are using shorthand and they usually
mean two things. First, they mean that behav- Despite the above caveats about the interpre-
ioral scores on certain standardized tests fall tation of uneven cognitive profiles, it is im-
within the normal range. However, second, portant to recognize that developmental disor-
they are proposing that the underlying cogni- ders can actually be very informative about
tive processes have developed normally. The constraints on plasticity. Plasticity is often in-
unfortunate prevalence of this terminological voked only in terms of the brain’s response to
shorthand has tended to obscure the fact that hemispherectomies after epilepsy, to early or
claims about intact and impaired functions in late damage and the like, as if plasticity were
genetic disorders actually constitute implicit a rare developmental process. As Wexler
developmental theories. (1996) put it:
More importantly, our view is that in de-
velopmental disorders, the existence of pure It is uncontroversial that the development [of Uni-
deficits alongside so-called intact modules can versal Grammar] is essentially guided by a biologi-
be challenged not just empirically but theoret- cal, genetically determined program. . . . Experi-
ence-dependent variation in biological structures orically as well. Even if selective, modular-like
processes . . . is an exception . . . and is calleddeficits were to exist in the older child and
“plasticity.”adult, we argue that modules are the result of
a process of development, not its starting
point (Karmiloff–Smith, 1992). The effects of Yet, in our view, the notion of genetic deter-
minism is misguided; plasticity is the rule, nota genetic mutation during embryogenesis and
postnatal brain growth are likely to be wide- the exception (see also Cicchetti & Tucker,
1994, for a similar argument). Indeed, plastic-spread across the developing system. Some do-
mains will be more affected than others due ity is central to all development, normal or
atypical, and explains how structure changesto the different features of their particular
problem space (Karmiloff–Smith, 1998; Kar- as a function of experience. However, plastic-
ity is not, of course, unconstrained. The initialmiloff–Smith, Scerif, & Thomas, 2002). It is
crucial to take into account how development properties of a learning system shape how
change occurs following experience. The adultitself might alter final outcomes. For instance,
a tiny impairment in infancy could impact dif- brain is in fact the sculpted result of a com-
plex interaction between the individual’s pro-ferentially over developmental time, such that
many domains are affected but some display cessing of a wide variety of structured inputs
and the neurocomputational constraints on theonly very subtle deficits, whereas others are
much more obviously impaired. Some sys- developing brain. A crucial goal, therefore, is
to identify those constraints. However, in iden-tems may develop atypically but still be able
to generate behavioral scores that fall within tifying relatively consistent brain structures in
the normal adult, as in the normal child, it isthe normal range on coarse standardized psy-
chological tests. Because cognitive systems difficult to distinguish two possible scenarios:
either the consistent structures emerge fromtend to interact during development (either di-
rectly or indirectly via the environment), a consistent regularities in the environments to
which children are exposed, what some havecognitive system that is developing atypically
may begin to subtly perturb the development- called “species-typical environments” (John-
son & Morton, 1991), or they arise from con-al trajectories of other systems with which it
interacts, and particularly those that attempt sistent neurocomputational constraints that
shape the course of development, despite vari-to compensate for emerging behavioral im-
pairments. The complex dynamics of interac- ability in the environment. It is here that ex-
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periments of nature may further our endeav- sition, because it is WS language that several
authors have embraced as the perfect illustra-ors: some children start life with brains that
have atypical neurocomputational constraints tion of an intact grammar module and the ex-
ample of a dissociation between language andbut live in relatively normal environments,
whereas other children may start out with po- the rest of cognition (Pinker, 1991, 1994;
Smith, 1999). Where appropriate, we contrasttentially normal brains but from the outset
grow up in very atypical environments (in WS with normal children who have experi-
enced early brain damage and those sufferingutero due to drugs or alcohol, or in the outside
world due to impoverished or violent condi- from other developmental disorders of genetic
origin. However, prior to doing so, we pro-tions). This distinction has also been dis-
cussed by Cicchetti (2002). The former case vide an account of the WS genotype and phe-
notype in order to situate our subsequent ar-is the focus of the present paper (for the latter,
radically atypical environments, see the re- guments.
view by Thomas, in press). We submit that
genetic developmental disorders can indeed A Specific Example: WSinform theories of normal development pro-
vided they are viewed as altered constraints WS is a rare neurodevelopmental disorder oc-
curring in approximately 1 in 20,000 live birthson neural plasticity in a developing organism
and not as illustrations of intact versus “dam- (Morris, Demsey, Leonard, Dilts, & Black-
burn, 1988). It gives rise to specific physical,aged” static modules.
behavioral and cognitive abnormalities, to-
gether with structural, chemical and func-Atypical Plasticity
tional anomalies in the developing brain (Bel-
lugi, Wang, & Jernigan, 1994; Grice et al.,As mentioned above, sometimes a specific
deficit arises after a focal lesion to the normal 2001; Mervis, Morris, Bertrand, & Robinson,
1999; Rae, Karmiloff–Smith, Lee, Dixon,adult brain. However, as we shall shortly see,
when a normal child suffers the same focal Blamire, Thompson, Grant, Styles, & Radda,
1998). The syndrome was initially reported bylesions as an adult but early in development,
selective deficits rarely ensue. This is because cardiologists (Beuren, Apitz, & Harmjanz,
1962; Williams, Barratt–Boyes, & Lowe, 1961),normal processes of plasticity are activated
and usually lead to recovery from early insult who discovered an association between the
existence of supravalvular aortic stenosis andwith no serious, lasting impairments. What
about the case of genetic developmental disor- a characteristic facial dysmorphology, to-
gether with growth retardation and learningders without focal brain damage? Why does
plasticity not simply compensate for the ge- difficulties. Known as WS in the United States
and Williams–Beuren syndrome in Continen-netic mutation and allow the child to recover
function in similar ways to normal children tal Europe, it was initially called Idiopathic
Infantile Hypercalcaemia in the United King-with early focal brain damage? We believe
this is because of the improbability that the dom because some infants with a similar clin-
ical description also presented with infan-genetic mutation merely affects a single, spe-
cific domain; rather, it is likely to affect plas- tile hypercalcemia (Black & Bonham–Carter,
1963). However, this turned out not to be aticity itself, because genetic mutations can
give rise to atypical neurocomputational con- defining characteristic in subsequent cases,
and so the disorder is now also referred to asstraints from the outset (Karmiloff–Smith,
Scerif, & Thomas, 2002). WS in the United Kingdom.
In this article, we use one genetic disorder,
WS, to illustrate how the atypical develop- The WS genotype
mental pathways followed by this disorder
may provide clues to the normal neurocompu- Most cases of WS syndrome are sporadic, al-
though a few instances of concordant mono-tational constraints on development. We focus
particularly on the domain of language acqui- zygotic twins and of parent to child transmis-
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sion have been reported in the literature (Morris, deletion of the LIM Kinase-1 (LIMK1) gene
because it is expressed in the brain. LIMK1 isThomas, & Greenburg, 1993; Pankau, Gosch,
Simeoni, & Wessel, 1993). Although for some situated telomeric to ELN and was found to
be deleted in all patients with a typical WS20 years WS was diagnosed only on the basis
of clinical criteria, the early 1990s hailed the deletion (Frangiskakis, Ewart, Morris, Mer-
vis, Bertrand, Robinson, Klein, Ensing, Ever-discovery of the first genetic markers of the
syndrome (Curran, Atkinson, Ewart, Morris, ett, Green, Proschel, Cutowski, Noble, Atkin-
son, Odelberg, & Keating, 1996; Tassabehji,Leppert, & Keating, 1993; Ewart, Morris,
Ensing, Loker, Moore, Leppert, & Keating, Metcalfe, Fergusson, Carette, Dore, Donnai,
Read, Proschel, Gutowski, Mao, & Sheer,1993). Curran and collaborators pointed to an
association between a disruption due to the 1996). LIMK1 encodes a protein tyrosine ki-
nase that inactivates cofilin, a protein requiredtranslocation of one copy of the elastin gene
at chromosome 7q11.23 and the existence of for the turnover of actin filaments (Arber,
Barbayannis, Hanser, Schneider, Stanyon, Ber-supravalvular aortic stenosis, a common fea-
ture of WS. Ewart and colleagues then con- nard, & Caroni, 1998). Mouse models had al-
ready shown that during embryogenesis LIMK1firmed that hemizygosity at the elastin locus
also occurred in patients with WS (Ewart, is expressed in the central nervous system, in-
cluding the inner nuclear layer of the retina,Morris, Atkinson, Weishan, Sternes, Spallone,
Stock, Leppert, & Keating, 1993). The elastin cortex, spinal cord, cranial nerves, and dorsal
root ganglia (Proschel, Blouin, Gutowski, Lud-gene is expressed during the third trimester in
utero and during early postnatal life. Its dele- wig, & Noble, 1995). Thus, mutations in the
expression of LIMK1 in WS are likely to af-tion leads to the production of structurally ab-
normal tropelastin and causes problems with fect axonal guidance during the crucial build-
ing of the central nervous system (for a re-elasticity and connective tissue in numerous
parts of the organism, particularly the skin view of the genes in the WS critical region,
see Franke, 1999).and arteries.
The microdeletion measures some 1.5 Mb
and is of fairly uniform size in the majority of The WS physical phenotypepatients with WS with the elastin gene being
midway between the two breakpoints (Perez– Mean birth weight in WS is low, with postnatal
growth retardation frequently reported. EarlyJuralo, Peoples, Kaplan, Hamel, & Franke,
1996). Parental origin seems to play no role; puberty also often contributes to the low final
adult height (Cherniske, Sadler, Schwartz,deletions on the maternally and paternally in-
herited chromosomes occurring with equal Carpenter, & Pober, 1999). The facial dys-
morphology is particularly characteristic. Pa-frequency. The mutational mechanism seems
to lay in unequal meiotic recombination be- tients have a flat nasal bridge and anteverted
nares, wide mouth with fleshy lips, periorbitaltween chromosome 7 homologues, although
intrachromosomal rearrangements also arise. fullness, flat malar region, small mandible
and prominent cheeks. Failure to thrive, oftenMore recently, it has been shown that large
repeats containing genes and pseudogenes flank due to difficulties in sucking, is reported dur-
ing early infancy. A prematurely aged appear-the two deletion breakpoints, thereby lending
themselves to chance misalignment (Peoples, ance is often apparent in late adolescence and
early adulthood. As mentioned, supravalvularFranke, Wang, Perez–Jurado, Paperna, Cisco,
& Franke, 2000; Robinson, Waslynka, Ber- aortic stenosis and peripheral pulmonary ar-
tery stenosis are very common in the syn-nasconi, Wang, Clark, Kotzot, & Schinzel,
1996; Urban, Helms, Fekete, Csiszar, Bonnet, drome (Hallidie–Smith & Karas, 1988), with
elevated blood pressure also frequently notedMunnich, Donis–Keller, & Boyd, 1996).
Once the locus of the WS deletion was in adolescents and adults (Broder, Reinhardt,
Ahern, Lifton, Tamborlane, & Pober, 1999).documented, several others genes started to be
identified in the critical region. Much excite- Some 50% of children with WS have strabis-
mus, commonly with refractive errors (Atkin-ment was generated by the discovery of the
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son, Anker, Braddick, Nokes, Mason, & Brad- They are, however, particularly empathetic to-
ward others’ emotions but far less skilled atdick, 2001; Winter, Pankau, Amm, Gosch, &
Wessel, 1996). Hyeracusis (an unusual hyper- understanding human intentionality (Tager–
Flusberg, Boshart, & Baron–Cohen, 1998).sensitivity to certain sounds) is present in as
many as 95% of patients, whereas audiometry Most studies estimate a mean full IQ of be-
tween 51 and 70 (Bellugi et al., 1994; Mervisis usually normal. Little is yet known about
central auditory processing in WS although et al., 1999; Udwin & Yule, 1991). It should
be noted, however, that full IQ scores camou-new research is underway (Cohen, Ansari,
Rosen, & Karmiloff–Smith, 2002). flage marked unevenness in the WS profile,
in which verbal IQ outstrips performance IQ
in the majority of cases. The pioneering workThe WS behavioral and cognitive phenotypes
of Bellugi and collaborators had originally
suggested some clear-cut dissociations in theIn experimental psychology and cognitive neu-
roscience, the terms behavioral and cognitive cognitive architecture of WS. Language and
face processing appeared to be preservedhave different meanings from the way in which
they are employed in clinical medicine. For alongside both general retardation and partic-
ularly serious problems with visuospatial cog-the clinician, behavioral phenotype refers to
emotional and personality traits, attention def- nition (Bellugi et al., 1994). However, as men-
tioned above, we challenge the notion thaticits, and IQ scores. Cognitive is simply sub-
sumed under the term behavioral and refers to behavioral abilities in a developmental disor-
der directly index underlying cognitive pro-the standardized measures of intelligence. In
experimental psychology, by contrast, behav- cesses (Karmiloff–Smith, 1998; Thomas &
Karmiloff–Smith, in press-a). Indeed, in-depthioral refers to measures of overt behavior, for
example, scores relating to whether the sub- analyses of the language and face processing
of WS adults, two areas frequently reported toject succeeds or fails at a task. The cognitive
level attempts to account for the mental pro- be intact, strongly suggest that the behavioral
proficiencies of these individuals are sup-cesses underlying the overt behavior, that is,
how the individual processes the inputs in- ported by different cognitive processes, com-
pared with normal controls.volved in the task. This is not unsimilar to an
early but hitherto rather neglected distinction
made by Werner (1937) between achievement Neurocomputational Constraints
and process. It must be always recalled, there-
on Development in WSfore, that the same overt behavior may be
achieved by different underlying cognitive Having set the stage for understanding the
characteristics of our particular experiment ofprocesses when comparing various disorders
to the normal case (Karmiloff–Smith, 1998). nature WS, we can now turn to the issues laid
out in our introductory sections as to what de-Thus, claims that certain aspects of a profile
are “unimpaired,” intact, preserved and the velopmental disorders can tell us about the
neurocomputational constraints that shape de-like need to be taken with caution until the
cognitive level has been fully explored. To velopment, using language acquisition as our
main illustration. The rest of this article willunderstand a syndrome in any depth, it is vital
to distinguish between the behavioral pheno- proceed as follows. We begin with a consider-
ation of the (static) “end-state” of languagetype and the cognitive phenotype. The behav-
ioral phenotype in WS includes what has been development in WS, including claims for se-
lective deficits and dissociations. To empha-termed “hypersociability” (Jones, Bellugi, Lai,
Chiles, Reilly, Lincoln, & Adolphs, 2000), in- sise the role that altered constraints on plastic-
ity must play in WS, we identify the type ofvolving a tendency to be overly friendly with
strangers and to lack social judgment skills acquired damage that causes similar patterns
of behavioral deficits in normal adults and(Einfeld, Tonge, & Florio, 1997; Gosch &
Pankau, 1997). People with WS frequently then examine what happens to normal chil-
dren who experience such damage early in de-display high anxiety about new situations.
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velopment. As we have seen, in our target dis- and SLI together represent a “genetic double
dissociation” pointing to the developmentalorder the cause is not acquired damage but a
genetic mutation acting from embryogenesis independence of language from cognition.
However, subsequent careful research hasonward. Consideration of a realistic causal
link between (potentially mutated) genes and led researchers to more refined claims, given
that a range of studies has revealed anomalies(potentially altered) behavior leads us to focus
on the precursors of language development in at all levels of language in WS, including
phonology, lexical-semantics, grammar, andWS. It is here that we have the best opportu-
nity to reveal the intrinsic neurocomputational pragmatics. Such studies include the examina-
tion of WS populations in several countries,constraints that differ in the infant with WS,
before they are obscured behind layers of de- such as the United States, Britain, Italy, France,
Spain, and Germany (see Thomas & Karmil-velopment driven by dynamic interaction with
the environment. A review of the available off–Smith, in press-a, for a review of this
work). It does appear true that in some cases,evidence leads us to a hypothesis concerning
the constraints that may be atypical in WS individuals with WS are competent at under-
standing and producing a wide range of so-language (and, by implication, that must act
appropriately in normal development). Armed phisticated grammatical constructions (see, e.g.,
Clahsen & Almazan, 1998). (It should, ofwith these, we offer a developmental theory
of the acquisition of language in this disorder course, be kept in mind that, as in many de-
velopmental disorders, there is great individ-and how this might enlighten theories of typi-
cal development. Finally, we focus on how ual variability in WS. Some lower functioning
individuals show much poorer language de-one might explore more precisely the influ-
ence of constraints on development within a spite having the same genetic deletion.) On
the other hand, in almost all cases of WS, lan-neurocomputational framework via the appli-
cation of connectionist modeling techniques. guage performance falls below that found in
chronological age-matched controls. Indeed,
most studies of language in WS now compareLanguage in late childhood/adulthood in WS performance against mental age (MA) con-
trols. Paradoxically, those claiming that lan-In the initial characterizations of WS, it was
thought that the seeming dissociation between guage and cognition are independent also opt
for MA-matched controls; yet this very choicelanguage and other general reasoning abilities
might represent an informative experiment of implicitly accepts a relationship between lan-
guage and cognition! Moreover, it is worthnature. Thus, Rossen, Klima, Bellugi, Bihrle,
and Jones (1996) commented that the syn- noting that full IQ measures make the lan-
guage results look more impressive than theydrome “presents a remarkable juxtaposition of
impaired and intact mental capacities . . . lin- really are. To state that a 25-year-old adult
with WS has a full IQ of 53 but understandsguistic functioning is preserved in Williams
syndrome while problem solving ability and complex embedded clauses seems impressive.
However, if assessed from a different angle,visuospatial cognition are impaired.” In Pink-
er’s initial references to the disorder (1991, that of MA, it is much less amazing. The
same 25-year-old individual with WS may1994), he viewed WS as an example of the
potential developmental independence of lan- have a verbal MA of 8, but then there is noth-
ing surprising about the fact that typicallyguage and cognition, consistent with his the-
ory that language (and particularly syntax) is developing 8-year-olds have mastered many
complex, structural aspects of language (seean innate, self-contained module. Indeed, he
contrasted WS with specific language impair- discussion in Karmiloff–Smith, 1998). It is
often the pragmatic limitations of WS lan-ment (SLI), a disorder that presents as a case
of impaired language development with ap- guage that draw listeners’ attention to the fact
that this individual’s conversation is not at theparently normal nonverbal cognition and in-
telligence. Given that SLI has a heritable level we expect for a typical 25-year-old, or
an 8-year-old, for that matter. For example, incomponent, Pinker (1999) argued that WS
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WS, speech content is often odd or out of tinctions (Temple et al., 2002). In the domain
of inflectional morphology, it has been arguedplace in a particular social context (Volterra,
Capirci, & Caselli, 2001), speech can contain that word inflections involving word-specific
knowledge (such as irregular past tenses andhigh levels of cliche´s and stereotyped phrases
(Howlin, Davies, & Udwin, 1998a), and the plurals) are selectively impaired in WS, where-
as those following grammatical rules are incomprehending of nonliteral language can be
very deficient (Howlin, Davies, & Udwin, line with MA (Clahsen & Almazan, 1998,
2001; Pinker, 1991, 1994), but, note, not chro-1998b).
Despite a retreat from some of the stronger nological age. Overall, the claim has been that
grammar is preserved in WS (i.e., developsclaims, two aspects of language in WS remain
notable. First, the language of these individu- normally), whereas some aspects of word
knowledge are impaired (i.e., develop atypi-als is often more advanced than that found in
other genetic developmental disorders with cally). To reiterate, the comparison is with
MA, not chronological age, so such claimscomparable IQ, such as Down’s syndrome
(Bellugi et al., 1994; Mervis et al., 1999). Sec- simply dismiss the considerable delay as if
delay in one system were completely indepen-ond, language performance in WS is markedly
out of step with their visuospatial cognition, dent of the rest of the developing system. WS
has nonetheless been used to support the posi-which is particularly poor and shows a charac-
teristic “featural” style of processing (De- tion that there is a dissociation between lan-
guage and cognition and that the distinctionruelle, Mancini, Livet, Casse´–Perrot, & de
Schonen, 1999; Donnai & Karmiloff–Smith, between grammar and the lexicon is innate
(e.g., Pinker, 1999).2000). Indeed, one of the defining criteria of
the cognitive phenotype of WS is the disparity There are a number of shortcomings with
these arguments, not least the fact that manybetween performance on standardized tests of
vocabulary and on standardized tests of visuo- of the empirical findings on which they are
based have employed very small numbers ofspatial construction (such as a copying a pat-
tern with a set of colored blocks, or copying a participants with WS and that they have often
failed to replicate when larger samples havepicture; Mervis, Robinson, Bertrand, Morris,
Klein–Tasman, & Armstrong, 2000). been used (e.g., standardized tests of word
fluency reveal that WS vocabulary is no moreHowever, claims persist that selective defi-
cits can be found within the language systems atypical than MA controls: Jarrold, Hartley,
Phillips, & Baddeley, 2000; Scott, Mervis,of individuals with WS and that such deficits
can inform theorists about the structure of the Bertrand, Klein, Armstrong, & Ford, 1995;
there is no significant selective deficit for ir-normal language system. For instance, Tem-
ple and colleagues argue that “the linguistic regular inflections over regular inflections:
Thomas, Grant, Gso¨dl, Laing, Barham, La-performance of [individuals with] WS can be
explained in terms of selective deficits to an kusta, Tyler, Grice, Paterson, & Karmiloff–
Smith, 2001; Zukowski, 2001; naming skillsotherwise normal modular system” (Temple
& Clahsen, in press, italics added) and as a pat- are in line with verbal MA: Thomas, Dockrell,
Messer, Parmigiani, Ansari, & Karmiloff–tern of “some preservation and some disability”
(Temple, Almazan, & Sherwood, 2002). The Smith, 2002). However, the selective-deficit
claims are illustrative of the view that it islatter claims for deficits have focused on the
representation of and access to word-specific sufficient to explain a developmentally disor-
dered system with reference to a static modelknowledge. For instance, the language of in-
dividuals with WS has frequently been char- of the normal adult language system and to
orient an empirical program merely towardacterized as containing unusual or low fre-
quency items (e.g., Bellugi et al., 1994; Pinker, identifying those components that are defi-
cient, thereby negating altogether the contri-1991, 1994; Rossen et al., 1996; Temple et
al., 2002), and older children with WS have bution of development.
We argue that this appeal to static modelsbeen argued to demonstrate naming deficits
and difficulties representing fine semantic dis- has inhibited progress in understanding WS
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in particular and developmental disorders in of brain damage when they occur in typically
developing young children, in whom we as-general, but we do not wish to overstate this
case. Even in the more static accounts, with sume that normal constraints on plasticity
hold.their postulation of preserved and impaired
components, there are occasional hints among The clearest parallels between behavioral
deficits in WS and those found in normalresearchers that the final explanation of anom-
alies in the WS system must fall within a de- adults with acquired brain damage have been
made in the domain of word inflections (e.g.,velopmental framework. Thus, Pinker com-
ments that “presumably LIM-kinase1 [deleted past tense of verbs, plurals of nouns, compar-
atives of adjectives). Thus, Pinker (1991,from one copy of chromosome 7 in WS] plays
an important role in the development of the 1994) has explicitly argued that the deficits
in inflectional morphology found in WS areneural networks used in spatial reasoning,
possibly in the parietal lobes. The other miss- similar to those occurring in fluent aphasia in
normal adults, following damage to left tem-ing genes, perhaps, are necessary for the de-
velopment of other parts and processes of the poral areas. These patients also show difficul-
ties in word retrieval. Similar parallels arebrain, though not for language” (1999, pp.
260–261, italics added). When Rossen et al. drawn with deficits displayed in neurodegen-
erative disorders, such as Alzheimer disease(1996) appealed to a static model of the WS
lexicon to explain the presence of unusual and cases of semantic dementia. These disor-
ders are also characterized by acquired func-words in WS vocabulary, they sought to char-
acterize the problem as a specific anomaly of tional damage that is greater in the temporal
areas and adjacent parietal areas than in theactivation dynamics against a background of
normal lexical structure: “While individuals frontal lobes. Moreover, for reference, as the
earlier quoation from Pinker implies, visuo-with WS have well organised semantic cate-
gories, and have good access to word knowl- spatial constructive deficits are found in nor-
mal adults following damage to parietal areas,edge, an anomaly does exist in some tasks
dependent on consideration of words in a and in particular, the featural style of process-
ing tends to be associated with right parietalcomplex activation environment.” Yet, in the
same article, when these researchers began to damage.
Note, however, that individuals with WSconsider the impact of development on the
disorder, they added that, so long as activation do not suddenly suffer discrete brain damage
in adulthood but have anomalies in braindynamics were involved in knowledge acqui-
sition, knowledge could not be normal while structures from the start of brain development.
What happens if these types of focal brainactivation dynamics were anomalous: “Con-
temporary neural models of learning postulate damage (to left temporal areas or right pari-
etal areas) occur to normal individuals earlydefinable quantitative relationships bridging
the classical dichotomy of structure and pro- in infancy? Another set of nature’s experi-
ments can provide the answer.cess . . . Within this model paradigm, if activ-
ity malfunction with the lexicon exists, then
abnormality of lexicon structure will likely Evidence for atypical constraintsfollow” (Rossen et al., 1996). Nevertheless,
on plasticity in WS
the prevalence of theories of the “preserved/
impaired” kind provides an opportunity to Bates and Roe (2001) recently reviewed the
evidence concerning the effects of early uni-stress our alternative claim that genetic devel-
opmental disorders are best viewed as altered lateral brain damage on the language develop-
ment of young children, including the effectconstraints on plasticity. To make this argu-
ment, we first consider what type of brain of lesion side (left or right hemisphere) and
lesion site. There were three main findings.damage might underlie the types of selective
deficits proposed, were they to appear in a First, almost all the children with brain injur-
ies exhibited delays in first-word production,normal adult. We then turn to the literature
on the developmental outcomes of these types regardless of lesion side or site. Bates and
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Roe interpret these data as suggesting that it tent pattern of behavioral deficits observed in
children with a history of early, generalizedis hard to get language “off the ground” after
significant damage to either hemisphere. Sec- cerebral deficits. Anderson, Northam, Hendy,
and Wrennall (2001) summarise the main fea-ond, delays in word production tended to be
more severe in children with left posterior tures as follows: bilateral tactile–perceptual
deficits (more marked on the left side of thedamage, particularly in the temporal lobe.
Bates and Roe note the apparently greater im- body), impaired visual recognition and dis-
crimination, impaired visuospatial organiza-portance of the left hemisphere, also interest-
ingly note the fact that in the adult it is left tion, bilateral psychomotor coordination prob-
lems (also more marked on the left side of thefrontal not temporal posterior damage that is
associated with expressive language deficits. body), and difficulties managing novel infor-
mation. Among these weaknesses are also ar-Third, and most relevant to our concerns, is
the fact that the evidence suggests that when eas of relative strength, which include simple
motor skills, auditory perception, rote learn-damage occurs prior to around 5–7 years of
age, plastic reorganization takes place such ing, selective and sustained attention for audi-
tory–verbal information, basic expressive andthat, when tested later, these children show
little if any language impairment. It is impor- receptive language, and word reading and spell-
ing. NVLD bears a number of similarities totant that there are no broad effects of side of
damage. In short, early damage to the left (or the features of WS, in particular the relative
strength of language compared to the deficitsright) hemisphere when there is normal plas-
ticity tends to lead to recovery with no long- in visuospatial skills. Indeed, within language
itself, Rourke and Tsatsanis (1996) point tolasting gross deficits.
The implication is that the analogies drawn a dissociation between better performance on
structural aspects of language than on prag-between behavioral deficits after focal lesions
in normal adults and behavioral deficits in in- matics, another similarity with WS. However,
differential perceptual and motor problemsdividuals with WS do not point to a common
underlying cause. Where focal damage occurs with the left side of the body have hitherto
not been reported in WS.in early childhood, normal plasticity is suffi-
cient to effect behavioral recovery as a result Rourke’s notion of NVLD is interesting
here in that it is allied to an underlying neuro-of ontogenetic development. If we rule out fo-
cal damage plus normal plasticity as an expla- logical explanation called the “white matter
hypothesis” (Rourke, 1987; see Anderson etnation for WS, then several options remain.
There could be widespread damage plus nor- al., 2001, for discussion). The idea is that the
global connectivity of the brain, the whitemal plasticity, focal damage plus atypical
plasticity, or widespread damage plus atypical matter, has a prolonged period of develop-
ment, in which it is particularly vulnerable toplasticity. Of these options, increasing evi-
dence suggests that the brains of individuals disruption after widespread damage in chil-
dren who have experienced conditions suchwith WS do not present with focal lesions
(and this is also the case for almost all other as traumatic brain injury, cranial irradiation to
treat tumours, or hydrocephalus. (Note thatgenetic developmental disorders), instead pre-
senting with widespread differences in neuro- under some circumstances, these conditions
may be associated with a normal genotype,anatomical features (Bellugi et al., 1994),
neuronal density (Galaburda, Wang, Bellugi, such that one might expect normal plasticity
if the mechanisms that support it have sur-& Rossen, 1994), biochemistry (Rae et al.,
1998), and electrophysiological activity (Grice vived.) Rourke then distinguishes between the
roles of white matter in the left and rightet al., 2001; Neville, Mills, & Bellugi, 1994).
The possibility that WS is caused by wide- hemispheres. He proposes that white matter
in the right hemisphere is important for bothspread but subtle damage plus normal plastic-
ity merits consideration. Rourke (e.g., 1987, development and maintenance of skills (in-
cluding global integration of information),1989) proposed the notion of nonverbal learn-
ing disability (NVLD) to account for a consis- whereas that in the left hemisphere is impor-
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tant for the development of skills but not nec- 1997, 1998). Given the complex and indirect
relationship between genes and brain develop-essarily their maintenance. In this view, the
right hemisphere is responsible for more inte- ment, it remains possible that different genes
have similar distal effects on brain develop-grative functions and the left hemisphere for
more segregated functions. Widespread dam- ment and lead to similar cognitive deficits. In-
deed, such a possibility has been explicitlyage to the white matter then results in greater
impairments to the functions of the right raised regarding similarities identified be-
tween WS and Velocardiofacial/DiGeorge syn-hemisphere (such as visuospatial integration
and pragmatic aspects of language) than to the drome (Beardon, Wang, & Simon, 2002), al-
though this initial comparison has yet to bemore self-contained functions of the left hemi-
sphere (such as processing of visual detail, au- established in depth.
ditory processing, and basic expressive and
productive language). A causal model for exploringIt is an appealing notion that that wide-
the relationship between genes and behavior
spread damage can itself result in differential
(seemingly selective) effects on the functions We have argued that the effects of a genetic
mutation that emerge during embryogenesisof left and right hemispheres, which normal
plasticity is unable to overcome during atypi- and postnatal brain growth are likely to be
widespread across the developing system, al-cal development (due to the severity of the
damage), for this would explain the subse- beit relatively subtle, but that a consequence
of the mutation can be the emergence of anquent uneven profile of cognitive abilities.
However, it is far from clear than NVLD is a uneven cognitive profile in the end-state. In
trying to link the genetic mutation to the finalhomogeneous syndrome; indeed, Rourke (1987)
prefers to conceptualize it as a “final common behavioral profile, it is important to have in
mind a realistic causal model in mind thatpathway” of deficits that may be caused by a
range of underlying pathologies. A range of could connect the two however indirectly.
Despite the fact that in recent times (anddisorders, including both those of genetic ori-
gin and of acquired early damage, are sub- often, admittedly, in the popular press), genes
have been specifically linked to behaviors (suchsumed under this heading, each of which
shares different levels of similarity to the pro- as the “gene for language,” the “gene for
crime,” the “gene for homosexuality,” etc.),totypical description of the disorder. As such,
NVLD may be a label attached to the com- the link between genes and adult behavior is,
of course, incredibly indirect and involvesmon behavioral deficits shared by very sub-
optimal cognitive systems, systems that differ many to many rather than one to one map-
pings between genes and behavioral pheno-as to their underlying causes and that, at a de-
tailed level, differ in their cognitive symp- types. Moreover, genetic mutations are lim-
ited in the ways in which they can disrupttoms. Gross behavioral deficits in the more
challenging, integrative aspects of cognition brain development. Pennington (2001) sug-
gests three broad classes of effects: (a) brainmay then be reached either by a system with
normal plasticity but widespread damage (if, size, in terms of altering the number of neu-
rons or synapses; (b) neuronal migration,indeed, the mechanisms of normal plasticity
remain after such damage) or by a system sometimes in a regionally specific fashion;
and (c) neurotransmission, either by changingwith both widespread anomalies and atypical
plasticity. It is the latter possibility that we levels of neurotransmitter or changing the
binding properties of receptor proteins. Towould argue is obtained in the case of genetic
developmental disorders such as WS, the rea- this we would add the fact that genetic muta-
tions can also affect the timing of gene ex-sons for which we address in the next section.
Nevertheless, despite the common tendency to pression that will have cascading effects on
the developing organism, because timing is aseek dissociations, the behavioral similarities
across genetic syndromes can also be very in- crucial aspect of the emergent organization of
the functional structure (Elman, Bates, John-formative (Bishop, 1997; Karmiloff–Smith,
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son, Karmiloff–Smith, Parisi, & Plunkett, cal or physiological properties.) Whether a
given subsystem falls inside or outside the1996; Huttenlocher, 2002; Karmiloff–Smith,
1992, 1998). It is important that these effects normal functional range as a consequence of
the operation of the equation depends on theimpact on the neurocomputational properties
of the brain, including the way in which it extent to which the development of that sub-
system relies upon the particular neurocom-modifies its structure as a consequence of in-
ternally or externally generated activity. Sub- putational constraints that were the atypical
outcome of the previous operation of thesequent behavioral deficits are the outcome of
a long trajectory of development, whereby cog- equation.2 Ultimately, this cascade of equa-
tions emanates from the gene products thatnitive structures emerge via an interaction be-
tween internal neurocomputational constraints were altered in embryogenesis by the original
genetic mutation.and the environment.
In placing development itself as a vital This is a complex formulation, but we be-
lieve it is a more realistic causal pathway thanfactor in the explanation of developmental
disorders (Karmiloff–Smith, 1998), we have that offered by static theories calling on pre-
served/impaired modules, because it includescharacterized the developmental emergence of
cognitive structures as a type of recursive development at every stage. It is important
that, as a causal model, it seeks to remain atequation (Thomas & Karmiloff–Smith, in
press-a). The equation is as follows: more a single (in this case, cognitive) level of de-
scription. Causal relations cannot, in our view,complex cognitive structure = less complex
structure × process of development. This operate across levels of description. That is,
neuronal activations do not cause mental rep-means that the process of development corre-
sponds to the interaction of an internal or ex- resentations; they are mental representations.
Genes cause molecular events. Thus, genesternal environment with the existing neuro-
computational constraints.1 are separated from behavior, not only by a
long and complex developmental trajectoryIn atypical development, the neurocompu-
tational constraints can differ. Under these but also by existing at a different, lower level
of description.conditions, each cycle of recursion that oper-
ates on a system may produce functional Having taken this point on board, we are
presented with a problem. If, to identify theproperties that fall inside or outside the nor-
mal range, and for any subsequent steps of causal origins of cognitive deficits, we must
remain at the cognitive level of description,development that rely on this system, a new
set of constraints that are more or less atypical then we are faced with the difficulty that the
fetus and newborn infant do not have cogni-for the next pass through the equation. The
result is that, across the whole developing tion in the way that children or adults do. To
construct the causal account, we must there-cognitive system, there emerges a complex,
graded pattern of areas that function either fore describe a protocognitive system in the
newborn or infant that produces behavioralwithin or outside the range of variation that
one might expect in the normal population. precursors to later complex behaviors that we
see in children and adults (Karmiloff–Smith,(In cognitive terms, these graded variations
are with respect to the functional properties of 1998). With development, mental representa-
tions begin at a simple, concrete level andsubsystems rather than their purely anatomi-
achieve an increase in abstractness and com-
plexity following operation of the recursive1. We thank our colleague, Julia Grant, for drawing our
attention to the fact that our statement of original plus
sign implied an additive process whereas we had in
mind a multiplicative one. In fact, more precisely, the 2. Whether the subsystem falls inside or outside the nor-
mal range of function is a dichotomy enforced by mea-equation should read f(x, y, z), where x is the initial
existing neurocomputational state, y defines the way it surement on a standardized test. Further, more subtle
measures are required to establish the degree to whichchanges in response to activity, and z is the internal/
external environment. However, the equation used above functional structure actually falls within the normal
range of variation.is more self-explanatory.
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equation we have proposed. Now, some might layed, is again within the normal range, a
pattern that contrasts with DS where gram-describe more complex/abstract cognitive pro-
cesses as “higher level” functions, and in this matical complexity is reduced for a given vo-
cabulary level (Singer Harris et al., 1997).sense, the equation recursively climbs from
lower to higher levels of representation across Despite the fact that phonological memory
appears as a relative strength in WS in child-development. However, it is crucial that the
distinction between low-level and high-level hood and adulthood (Mervis et al., 1999), a
study of the ability of infants and toddlersrepresentations is one of complexity and ab-
stractness whereas the causal relations remain with WS to segment fluent speech stream into
words revealed serious delays (Nazzi, Pater-at the same cognitive level of description. (Of
course, different disciplines will seek to char- son, & Karmiloff–Smith, 2003). In part, then,
language delays may be due to problems withacterize this recursive causal equation at other
levels of description, such as at the level of the early development of speech perception
and phonological representations.neural structure when characterizing the emer-
gence of atypical brain structures.) However, some precursors appear not just
delayed but atypical. For example, Laing andWe have taken a short diversion from WS
to make this conceptual clarification, but the colleagues examined sociointeractive precur-
sors to language development in toddlers withoutcome is a clear message of methodology.
If we are to tease apart the cascade of devel- WS compared with MA controls (Laing, But-
terworth, Ansari, Gso¨dl, Longhi, Panagiotaki,opmental equations that has led to cognitive
deficits in the adult state, we must pursue Paterson, & Karmiloff–Smith, 2002). Al-
though toddlers with WS were proficient atthose deficits back down the cascade, to their
origins in infancy (Brown, Johnson, Paterson, dyadic interactions with a caregiver (and, in-
deed, sometimes exceeded the scores of MAGilmore, Gso¨dl, Longhi, & Karmiloff–Smith,
2003; Karmiloff–Smith, 1998; Paterson, Brown, controls due to persistent fixation on the care-
giver’s face; see also Bertrand, Mervis, Rice,Gso¨dl, Johnson, & Karmiloff–Smith, 1999).
In studying cognitive precursors of complex & Adamson, 1993; Jones et al., 2000), there
was a marked deficiency in triadic interac-behaviors, we will find the clearest evidence
of the altered neurocomputational constraints tions incorporating an object. Specifically,
toddlers with WS had difficulty switching at-that are the first cognitive consequence of a
genetic mutation. tention from the caregiver to an object that
was being referred to in communication (via
pointing, looking, and naming). One mightAtypical precursors to language in WS imagine that this deficiency would disadvan-
tage the toddlers with WS in learning theThe most salient aspect of the onset of lan-
guage in WS is that it is delayed. Although names of objects, because shared attention to
newly named objects appears to be one of thethis delay is variable, one study of 54 children
with WS found an average delay of 2 years, main routes into vocabulary acquisition. In-
deed, there is accumulating evidence that pre-similar to that found for children with Down
syndrome (DS; Singer Harris, Bellugi, Bates, cursors to vocabulary development in WS are
atypical.Jones, & Rossen, 1997; see also Paterson et
al., 1999). Although delayed, some aspects of Typically developing infants use the pres-
ence of linguistic or gestural information ac-early development reveal normal behavioral
patterns. For example, the onset of hand bang- companying the introduction of novel objects
to influence their subsequent categorization ofing predicts the onset of canonical babbling in
infants with WS in the same way as it does in those objects, sometimes over and above the
perceptual similarities among the objects. How-typically developing infants (Masataka, 2001;
Mervis & Bertrand, 1997). Moreover, once ever, Nazzi and Karmiloff–Smith (2002)
found that 2- to 6-year-old children with WSlanguage development commences, the rela-
tionship between vocabulary size and gram- were significantly less able than typical con-
trols to use verbal cues to constrain categori-matical complexity, although seriously de-
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zation. Masataka (2000) found a similar pov- with WS exhibited the reverse pattern (unlike
children with DS, who displayed the normalerty in the ability of 2- to 3-year-olds with
WS to use gestural information to constrain pattern).
Finally, anecdotal parental reports havecategorization.
In typically developing children, the ability suggested that young children with WS some-
times appear to say more than they actuallyto use pointing to refer to objects tends to
emerge before the use of verbal labels for the comprehend (Singer Harris et al., 1997). Con-
sistent with this, there is some systematic evi-same purpose. Presumably, pointing indexes
the emergence of the cognitive ability to make dence that, compared to normal children, the
vocabulary of young children with WS exhib-reference, prior to the lexical manifestation.
Pointing to objects and eliciting pointing be- its a reduced advantage for comprehension
vocabulary over production vocabulary (Pat-havior in adults also facilitate the ability to
find the correct referent for a given label. erson, 2000), implying a relatively higher pro-
ductive vocabulary for their level for compre-However, Mervis and Bertrand (1997) found
that in WS the order was reversed, the onset hension.
In summary, precursors to language devel-of productive vocabulary preceding pointing.
Laing et al. (2002) confirmed a deficit in the opment in WS paint a picture with two main
themes. First there is an overall delay, perhapspointing behavior of infants with WS, despite
relative proficiency at fine motor skills. Vo- of a more generalized nature, incorporating
delays in at least motor, phonological, and se-cabulary acquisition therefore appears to rely
on a different set of cues and constraints mantic development. Second, when language
development gets underway, a differential bal-in WS. When Stevens and Karmiloff–Smith
(1997) examined the constraints that older ance emerges between the ability to encode
and produce word forms, on the one hand, andchildren and young adults with WS were us-
ing to learn labels for novel words, these also the acquisition of the semantic underpinnings
for those words, on the other.appeared atypical.
It is often the case that WS seems to pres-
ent with a mixture of typical and atypical pat- A developmental framework for language
terns within the same domain. For example,
acquisition in WSMervis and Bertrand (1997) found that when
playing with toys, nonverbal play patterns and The psychological literature on the language
of older children, adolescents, and adults withobject label comprehension patterns in chil-
dren with WS showed the normal priority of WS is more substantial, but two types of hy-
pothesis can be identified within it (Thomasbasic level categories over subordinate cate-
gories, a pattern also found in DS. However, & Karmiloff–Smith, in press-a). The first hy-
pothesis is a conservative one, which is thatrelations between markers of semantic knowl-
edge and productive vocabulary yet again ap- the language of individuals with WS is broadly
in line with their overall learning disabilities.peared atypical in the WS group. For instance,
spontaneous exhaustive sorting of objects (such From this perspective, some anomalies arise
as an indirect effect of their other deficits,as arranging toy animals and blocks into their
separate categories) indexes the development such as the visuospatial deficit that causes dif-
ficulty in acquiring prepositions that encodeof semantic knowledge and tends to precede
a rapid rise in the rate of vocabulary acquisi- spatial relations (Jarrold, Phillips, Baddeley,
Grant, & Karmiloff–Smith, 2001). It is inter-tion in typically developing children. Thus, by
the time children became clear into which cat- esting that the data also point to a general
problem in WS with relational terms likeegories objects fall, it becomes increasingly
easier for them to attach consistent labels to “darker than” that are nonspatial and yet in-
volve the need to generate spatialized internaldifferent objects. However, for children with
WS, Mervis and Bertrand (1997) found no ev- mental representations to process them. How-
ever, although this may explain local difficul-idence that exhaustive sorting preceded the
vocabulary spurt; indeed, several children ties in some aspects of WS language, such a
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conservative hypothesis fails, of course, to ac- WS (Johnson & Carey, 1998), as well as by
work on the development of semantic catego-count for why language development should
be better in WS than in other disorders with ries and metaphor comprehension (Thomas,
van Duuren, Ansari, Parmigiani, & Karmil-comparable IQ, such as DS.
The second hypothesis is the more preva- off–Smith, 2002). However, language devel-
opment in WS is bolstered by a relativelent and, in line with the conclusions of the
preceding section, views language in WS as strength in phonological processing that per-
mits the encoding and production of a rangeevolving according to an atypical balance of
constraints from phonology and semantics. As of words. This form of compensation is evi-
denced indirectly by basic measures of non-yet, there is no consensus on whether the dif-
ferential balance is caused simply by a rela- word repetition (Mervis et al., 1999) but also
directly by analyses suggesting that the contri-tive strength in phonology, simply by a rela-
tive weakness in semantics, by a difficulty in bution of phonology to word learning com-
pared to that of the existing lexicon may beintegrating these two sources of information,
or by some combination of these possibilities. greater in WS than is typical after 5 years of
age (Grant, Karmiloff–Smith, Gathercole, Pat-Nevertheless, there is now sufficient evidence
to begin to sketch out a developmental theory erson, Howlin, Davies, & Udwin, 1997), and
from word learning tasks suggesting preferen-of language acquisition in WS, a theory that
stands in marked contrast to accounts that tial use of phonological over semantic infor-
mation (Laing, Hulme, Grant, & Karmiloff–have dealt purely in terms of selective deficits
to a static model of the normal system. We Smith, 2001). The outcome in WS is a language
system that is preferentially geared toward en-have constructed this preliminary account in
the context of our recent work exploring the gaging and maintaining social interaction and
that uses well-formed socially effective vo-causes of the unusual, socially engaging vo-
cabulary in the language of individuals with cabulary and phrases with only approximate
semantic underpinnings. Unusual vocabularyWS (Thomas et al., 2002). This phenomenon
is one of its most widely reported characteris- in WS is successful in engaging interest, but
closer inspection suggests that it is not sup-tics, a finding that led to the claims about iso-
lated deficits in word-specific knowledge that ported by appropriate contextual nuances of
meaning (Rossen et al., 1996).we discussed in a previous section.
In our preliminary account, language in In our view, this sketch emphasizes para-
digmatic characteristics of the way in whichWS is seen in a wider sociocommunicative
context and in a developmental framework to explore the origin of cognitive deficits in
developmental disorders: we should explorethat takes into consideration the way in which
compensation can occur in a system that has developmental precursors in infancy and build
these into a dynamic account that incorporatesdifferent initial processing biases but can be
adapted to meet the social needs of the indi- both the social environment of the individual
and the capacity for compensation, given thevidual. From this perspective, the unusual
characteristics of conversation in WS reflect a altered constraints acting on development.
Against this type of account, we have con-form of developmental compensation in which
language is used primarily to meet the (possi- trasted an approach to language in WS that
only references a static model of the normalbly heightened) social needs of the individual
(Jones et al., 2000), but acquisition is re- system and claims a dissociation between
“preserved” syntactic knowledge and “im-stricted by a difficulty in extracting the exact
sense and context in which vocabulary items paired” word-specific knowledge (Clahsen &
Almazan, 1998). In fact, we believe that cur-are being used by the speaker. Indeed, the fi-
nal semantic and conceptual representations rently there is neither strong support for a
grammar–lexicon dissociation in WS nor aformed in individuals with WS may well be
shallower with less abstract information and theoretical consensus among linguists or psy-
chologists that this type of dissociation wouldmore perceptually based detail, as suggested
by work examining conceptual knowledge in be developmentally plausible, given the dy-
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namic and constant interactions between these ing substrate, permit us to make contact with
the neural level as well. Connectionist net-two aspects of language during normal acqui-
sition. Thus, processing in the WS lexicon ap- works are an example of this type of model-
ing and are particularly well suited to explor-pears inefficient, as does the processing of
syntax in WS (as evidenced by exaggerated ing developmental questions (Elman et al.,
1996; Karmiloff–Smith, 1992). We would ar-patterns of difficulty in WS in sentence pro-
cessing tasks; for discussion see Grant, Val- gue that without computational modelling to
link the cognitive and neural levels, research-ian, & Karmiloff–Smith, 2002; Thomas et al.,
2001; Thomas & Karmiloff–Smith, in press- ers are left without a concrete idea of what a
“developmental process” might constitute anda; Zukowski, 2001). The most salient and
agreed upon dissociation within the WS cog- what implications it might have in producing
or recovering from deficits. It is one thing tonitive system remains the one first identified
by Bellugi and colleagues, which concerns an stress the importance of development in un-
derstanding developmental disorders. It is an-imbalance between some aspects of language
(such as vocabulary) and visuospatial process- other to begin to address precisely what the
developmental process involves.ing (see WS Cognitive Profile: Mervis et al.,
1999). Moreover, even here, evidence of im- Connectionist models have been applied to
several developmental disorders, includingpairments in spatial vocabulary and spatial
representations in WS (Jarrold et al., 2001) WS, SLI, autism, developmental dyslexia, and
schizophrenia. In these cases, the researchersuggests that this dissociation is not static but
has implications when spatial and language starts with a model formulated to capture the
normal trajectory of development in a givensystems interact across developmental time.
cognitive domain. Over the last 15 years, con-
nectionist models have been applied to manyComputational approaches phenomena within normal cognitive develop-
ment, including those in infancy (e.g., catego-If links are to be made between genotype and
phenotype in developmental disorders, we rization, object-directed behavior, memory),
in childhood (e.g., Piagetian reasoning taskshave argued that researchers must identify
atypical neurocomputational constraints on such as the balance scale problem, seriation,
and conservation), and in language develop-plasticity that shape subsequent trajectories of
cognitive development from infancy onward. ment (e.g., categorization of speech sounds,
segmentation of the speech stream into words,The preceding two sections have presented
psychological evidence pointing toward the vocabulary development, inflectional mor-
phology, syntax, metaphor, reading). In thesetypes of constraints that may be atypical in
WS language development. However, notions models, it is possible to identify the computa-
tional constraints that guide the normal trajec-like phonology and semantics are some way
from the neurocomputational characteristics tory of development, such as the architecture
of the connectionist network, the activationthat may have been altered by early neurobio-
logical events and subsequent developmental dynamics of the system, its input and output
representations, and its learning rule (Karmil-cascades from embryogenesis onward. In or-
der to build links between the psychological off–Smith & Thomas, in press; Thomas &
Karmiloff–Smith, 2002, 2003, in press-a, incognitive level of description and the neural
level, in our view, it is essential, to explore press-b). Either psychological or neuroscien-
tific data are then used to motivate alterationsthe intermediate level of computational learn-
ing systems (Karmiloff–Smith, 1992). Such to these initial constraints in an attempt to
capture the atypical trajectory of developmentlearning systems permit us to build models
that encode information at the conceptual level observed in a particular disorder and any end-
state deficits in the adult.(e.g., word forms and meanings), thereby
making contact with the psychological data, To the intermediate level of computational
modeling, one may import downward con-and for those classes of models that share neu-
rocomputational principles with the underly- straints from the psychological level, such as
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the differences found in phonological and se- aspects of the cognitive domain only follow-
ing damage to the end-state. To the extent thatmantic representations of individuals within
WS (Thomas & Karmiloff–Smith, in press-a) these networks serve as valid models of
development, the results emphasize the im-or in the phonological representations of indi-
viduals with SLI or developmental dyslexia portance of the developmental process in
determining the patterns of end-state deficits(e.g., Harm & Seidenberg, 1999; Hoeffner &
McClelland, 1993). Alternately, one may im- following alteration to different initial neuro-
computational constraints.port constraints from the neural level upward,
such as the differences in neuronal density ob- In another set of simulations (Thomas &
Karmiloff–Smith, in press-b), we examined aserved in different areas of the brains of indi-
viduals with autism (Cohen, 1998) or differ- developmental system that produced emergent
specialization of particular functions to partic-ences in the level of dopamine in the frontal
lobes of individuals with schizophrenia (Co- ular structures during development. This model
allowed us to explore the conditions underhen & Servan–Schreiber, 1992).
One of the advantages of computational which static explanations of developmental
disorders might hold. That is, if modules aremodels is that they allow candidate explana-
tions of the developmental process to be ex- an outcome of development and one part of
the system is damaged prior to training, doesplicitly formulated and for the process to be
examined under a range of controlled condi- the rest of the system nevertheless develop
normally? Such a condition (which we termtions beyond the scope of current empirical
methods. For example, in one set of simula- residual normality) must hold if strong analo-
gies are to be drawn between selective cogni-tions (Thomas & Karmiloff–Smith, in press-
b), we compared the effect of the same type tive deficits in developmental disorders and
those found in cases of adult damage to pre-of damage applied to a developmental system
either prior to training (to represent the case viously normally developed brains. Our simu-
lations revealed that the conditions under whichof a developmental disorder) or following
training (to represent the case of an adult- residual normality would hold are fairly nar-
row, and in many cases developmentally im-acquired disorder). This comparison allowed
us to assess the contribution of the develop- plausible. A developmental system suffering
initial, selective damage tends to use its re-mental process (here, a learning rule driving
the acquisition of a representative cognitive maining resources to compensate for the ini-
tial damage across development. Our compu-domain) in producing patterns of deficits in
the final trained state following various differ- tational work therefore supports the conclusions
in the previous section, where we establishedent types of damage. The results revealed a
complicated relationship between patterns of that in many cases focal brain damage in young
healthy children is followed by recovery.deficits following “start-state” damage and
patterns of deficits following end-state dam- Computational models can also be applied
to particular disorders and specific sets of em-age. For certain types of damage (e.g., lesion-
ing), the system was far more sensitive to pirical data. This type of work allows us to
evaluate whether particular theoretical claimsdamage in the end-state than the start-state:
development served to attenuate the effects of are actually sufficient to explain the behav-
ioral deficits observed in a given develop-differences in the processing structures. For
other types of damage (e.g., processing noise), mental disorder. Thus, in separate work (Thom-
as & Karmiloff–Smith, in press-a), we ex-the system was far more sensitive to damage
in the start-state than the end-state: develop- plored how a connectionist model of normal
development of inflectional morphology (thement served to exaggerate the effects of dif-
ferences in the activation dynamics because in English past tense) may be applied to the case
of WS. This type of a model attempts to maxi-the end-state the representations were already
more stable. In some cases the effects of dam- mize the psychological plausibility of its con-
straints and fit actual patterns of empiricalage were global (noise, lesioning), but in other
cases the deficit was selective to particular data from typically developing children when
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the constraints are normal and from the target contain simplifications (the hallmark of any
modeling process), we believe that they repre-disorder when the constraints have been al-
tered from the outset, in line with the avail- sent one of the vital ways forward in evaluat-
ing developmental deficits with a very con-able empirical evidence.
In WS, the evidence on the acquisition of crete notion of the developmental process in
mind. Thus, although our model demonstratedpast tense formation initially indicated diffi-
culty with producing irregular inflections (e.g., deficits at the end of its development that
matched patterns found in adults with WS, itthink–thought, give–gave) (Clahsen & Alma-
zan, 1998). However, these preliminary find- is crucial that those deficits were the outcome
of differential initial computational constraintsings were hard to replicate, and larger studies
suggested that problems exist in both general- and the subsequent process of development
and did not correspond to the simple removalizing inflectional regularities to novel word
forms (wug–wugged) and the differential in- of any preexisting static structures.
fluence of lexical semantics on inflection in
WS. (Typically developing children found ir- Conclusion: Contribution
regular verbs with more abstract meanings to Developmental Theory of the Studyharder to inflect than those with more con-
of Language in WS—A Natural
crete meanings, but children and adults with Experiment of NatureWS performed equally on both; Thomas et al.,
2001.) Consistent functional structure appears to
emerge in the cognitive systems of normalIn using a computational model to explore
this aspect of language acquisition in WS, we adults, and there has long been a debate about
the origin of this consistency. At one extreme,pursued the hypotheses discussed in the previ-
ous two sections. We explored whether ma- there have been theories of prewired, innate
modular structure; at the other extreme, therenipulations to the initial phonological and se-
mantic representations within the normal model have been theories of equipotentiality and
structure derived from regularities in the en-were sufficient to shift its developmental per-
formance from that of typically developing vironmental input. Developmental cognitive
neuroscience has recently moved toward achildren to that of our WS cohort. The results
showed that insufficiently abstract phonologi- middle path, the idea of emergentism, where-
by initial constraints in computational proper-cal representations (i.e., with reduced redun-
dancy and similarity between phonemes) were ties in the brain “seed” specialization that
emerges as a product of development (Elmanable to capture the problems in inflecting
novel forms and that weakened semantic rep- et al., 1996; Karmiloff–Smith, 1992, 1998;
see Thomas, in press, for discussion). How-resentations were able to capture poor devel-
opment of irregular inflection, as well as em- ever, revealing the nature of these constraints
is complex because normal development con-pirical evidence for differential influence of
semantic variables such as abstractness of verb founds the consistency of these constraints
across the population with the consistency ofmeaning. This model demonstrated the impor-
tant concepts that in order to capture the full the environment to which most individuals
are exposed. It is thus developmental disor-range of individual variation in the empirical
data for individuals with WS, multiple initial ders that may provide a window on these con-
straints, because they represent a situation inneurocomputational constraints had to be al-
tered; but when more than one constraint was which the constraints start out differently and
cognitive-level deficits may be the eventualaltered, the effects on the subsequent develop-
mental trajectory tended to be interactive outcome of development rather than the initial
state.rather than additive. For example, weaker se-
mantic constraints tended to exaggerate the In the case of genetic developmental disor-
ders with uneven cognitive profiles in theireffects of changes to the phonological con-
straints. outcome, we have started to begin to explore
more specific links between genotype andAlthough models such as these necessarily
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phenotype via case study comparisons (Kar- static accounts of deficits need to be replaced
by developmental accounts. To do so, wemiloff–Smith, Grant, Ewing, Carette, Met-
calfe, Donnai, Read, & Tassbehji, 2003). Yet, have explored similarities to, and differences
from, deficits found in cases of child andin our view, progress cannot be made if re-
searchers continue to characterize deficits adult acquired brain damage. A realistic
causal model of the link between genes andwithin static models, based on behavioral data
from older children and adults (Frangiskakis behavior has led us to examine a range of
atypical precursors to language developmentet al., 1996). This is because the behavioral
deficits that arise from genetic mutations must in WS, and then to construct a preliminary
developmental account of WS language ac-be traced back to their infant origins and to
the cognitive level of account with develop- quisition. Finally, we have stressed the utility
of computational modeling for linking cogni-ment as a crucial component of the link (Kar-
miloff–Smith, 1998; Karmiloff–Smith, Scerif, tive and neural levels in the study of develop-
mental disorders and for evaluating concrete& Ansari, 2003).
In this paper, we have illustrated this argu- formulizations of the developmental process.
In conclusion, we believe we have demon-ment with reference to one disorder, WS. We
have detailed the genotype, as well as the strated that developmental disorders can be
highly effective experiments of nature, pro-physical phenotype, and cognitive phenotype.
Then, concentrating on the domain of lan- vided the very process of development itself
remains at the heart of the explanation.guage development, we have shown how
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